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 1.  Introduction
Since the advent of democracy in South Africa, the regulation of the labour 
market has been a source of ongoing debate. There are, of course, political 
reasons for this. However, another reason is the fact that labour is often the 
only significant cost over which firms have some control. Labour legislation 
unquestionably circumscribes how that control is exercised, and imposes 
costs that firms would not have in the absence of such regulation. 
A key question that arises is whether one can quantify the costs that labour 
regulation imposes, and compare such costs across countries. The World 
Bank’s “Doing Business” (DB) Survey is by far the most ambitious such study 
to date. The idea behind DB is to benchmark regulation across different 
economies, and in so doing to stimulate labour market reform. Because the 
Bank is a global institution, this project has enjoyed a high profile. 
This study is concerned with the validity of endeavours to measure labour 
regulation, and identifies a number of methodological problems that constrain 
any such endeavour. It then focuses specifically on the methodology employed 
in the DB survey, and its results for South Africa. It presents evidence that 
certain scores arrived at in the case of SA are incorrect, materially affecting 
South Africa’s ranking in terms of the survey. These errors can be attributed to 
shortcomings in the survey’s methodology as well as the simplistic conceptions 
of law reflected in the surveys. This finding does not imply that endeavours to 
measure the costs of regulation are without value. 
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 2.  Methodological Considerations in Costing Regulation
Against a background of increasing popularity of deregulation, a study 
was undertaken in 1999 under the auspices of the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI). Known as the National Small Business Regulatory 
Review, its goal was to assess the impact of all regulations affecting 
small business, including labour legislation. The value of the study was 
undermined by the failure to define small business satisfactorily. 
A further study of employer perceptions in small, medium and micro enterprises 
(SMMEs) in Johannesburg was carried out in 2000, led by the World Bank. 
The survey sought to test the perceived effect on employment of each of the 
four labour statutes the new government introduced – the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act (BCEA), the Skills Development Act (SDA), the Employment 
Equity Act (EEA) and the Labour Relations Act (LRA). 
The statutes comprise a range of provisions, with very different effects. It is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to measure the impact of the statute as 
a whole, let alone four statutes, unless all that is being done is to measure 
perceptions. Measuring perceptions has validity insofar as perceptions shape 
conduct. But questions remain as to what these perceptions are of, and how 
they inform a response to the findings. There is no attempt to interrogate the 
accuracy of interviewees’ understanding of the content of labour laws. 
A more recent investigation of the impact of regulation by the Small Business 
Project adopts a similar approach to the World Bank study. Firms were asked 
to identify: “What factors most discourage you from hiring more employees?” 
Twenty percent of interviewees responded by saying “labour laws/government 
regulations in general”, compared with 25 percent who answered “lack of 
confidence/demand in the economy.”
The fact that “labour laws” are grouped together with a category “government 
regulations in general” makes the responses practically worthless. 
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Against this background, the appeal of the basis of the DB survey is obvious. 
It purports to be founded on quantitatively verifiable data, and can therefore 
be presented as objective. 
In 2007, the DTI published an Investment Climate (IC) survey which relied 
heavily on the DB survey to supplement data based on employer perceptions. 
The IC is a survey of over 800 firms, conducted by a private agency in 
conjunction with the DTI and World Bank. On the question of labour regulation, 
it said that “when firms were asked whether certain areas of the investment 
climate were a problem for business, close to 33 percent said that it (labour 
regulation) was a major or very severe obstacle…” The survey concluded 
that the “burden of labour regulation” led to “quite a sobering” assessment of 
South Africa’s competitiveness. However, this paper argues that the DB data 
do not provide a basis for making this type of assessment – whether positive 
or negative.
 3. The World Bank’s Doing Business (DB) Survey
The assumptions of the survey on the “standardized employee” are very 
specific (and based on a study done by Botero et al.) The employees are male 
and have been working for the same firm for 20 years. The firm is engaged in 
manufacturing, employs more than 200 workers, is wholly owned by nationals, 
etc. 
These assumptions for South Africa focus on fairly large firms, and certainly 
not the kind of business that has been the focus of the debate about labour 
market regulation. This is the kind of firm that a foreign investor might be 
interested in establishing. 
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It is enlightening to consider some of the comments about regulation that 
appear in the DB report: 
•	 Cumbersome regulation is associated with lower productivity. 
•	 Heavier regulation is associated with informality and corruption. 
•	 Poor countries regulate business the most. 
•	 Heavier regulation brings bad outcomes. 
•	 One size can fit all, in the manner of business regulation. 
The sweeping nature of these propositions is striking, and gives rise to the 
question: “What precisely is meant by regulation?” No attempt is made to 
define what is meant by regulation. This underscores the fallacy that “poor 
countries regulate most”. The report acknowledges elsewhere that these 
same countries have the least capacity to enforce regulation. It is misleading 
to analyse regulation in isolation from enforcement. 
DB assumes that the cost imposed on an employer has negative economic 
consequences for that employer and the economy as a whole. DB takes no 
account of the capacity of labour market regulation to produce greater equity. 
The DB index ignores the fact that many of the real impacts of a law may stem 
from the way it is interpreted or applied by functionaries such as arbitrators, 
judges, labour inspectors, stakeholders such as employers, employees and 
trade unions, as well as professionals such as labour consultants and lawyers. 
The World Bank has accepted that some of the costs of unfair dismissal law in 
South Africa arise from “misinterpretations” of the law. 
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 4.   The “Doing Business” Methodology Applied to 
 Labour Legislation in South Africa
Three indices have been constructed to measure employment regulation, 
namely the “difficulty of hiring” index; the “restrictions on expanding or contracting 
the number of working hours’ index”, and the “difficulty of firing” index, which, 
curiously, is exclusively concerned with the situation of redundancy. The 
average of the three indices provides a “rigidity of employment” index. 
Sub-Saharan Africa does not fare well on this index. The continent scores 
47,1, compared with a rating of 23 for East Asia and the Pacific. South Africa 
scores 41 and Mozambique 54. 
  4.1 The “Difficulty of Hiring” Index
This measure is concerned with hiring by means of part-time or fixed-term 
contracts. Part-time work, it argues, is attractive to businesses where countries 
exempt part-time workers from the benefits that apply to full-time workers, and 
because part-time contracts are easier to terminate. 
The focus of the inquiry is on fixed-term contracts, which merits the first 
question: 
i) Whether term contracts can be used only for temporary tasks.
South Africa is rated negatively on this question, as a country that permits 
fixed-term contracts only for temporary tasks. This is not correct. There is no 
prohibition in the law on the use of a fixed-term contract for any type of task 
and any type of employment. Widespread use is made of fixed-term contracts 
by temporary employment services, contract cleaning firms and security 
services, among other sectors, even where the employees concerned are in 
effect employed indefinitely.
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Contrary to the DB rating, South Africa employers have a considerable level of 
flexibility to employ workers under fixed-term contracts.
ii) The maximum cumulative duration of term contracts.
Here South Africa scores positively, which is further proof that the rating given 
to South Africa on the previous question is incorrect. If term contracts can only 
be used for temporary tasks, then the maximum cumulative duration of term 
contracts must logically be the period for which the temporary task endures.
iii) The ratio of the mandated minimum wage for a trainee or first-time 
employee to the average value added per worker 
The rationale for including this question as part of the difficulty of hiring index is 
that the lower the ratio between the wage that an employer is required to pay 
a new employee and the average value added per worker, the more likely an 
employer is to employ new employees. The average value added per worker 
serves as an indicator of productivity. 
South Africa’s ratio was calculated as being 0,46 in 2006 and 0,67 in 2007. 
The basis of this calculation is not apparent from either the reports or the 
website and there is no published or accessible information indicating what 
assumptions were made or why there is such a large increase between the two 
years. These difficulties indicate why the rating provides no guidance about 
the real difficulty associated with hiring employees.  
The question here is whether there is something in South Africa that could 
be described as a “mandated minimum wage for a trainee or first-time 
employee”? Bargaining council agreements do set minimum wages, but most 
employees are not covered by bargaining council agreements. It is also highly 
inappropriate that a scheme to incentivise employment of learners should be 
classified as a “mandated minimum wage.” 
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If the assumptions on which the DB survey purports to be based are in fact of 
limited application, then limited weight can be attached to the answer. This is 
the case for South Africa and may well be true of other countries that regulate 
minimum wages, but do not do so comprehensively.  
  4.2 The “Rigidity of Hours” Index
One of the aspects looked at here is whether night work is restricted. Here, 
the question was sometimes phrased as whether night work is “allowed” and 
whether is it is “unrestricted”. South Africa allows night work, but because 
the DB survey researchers felt it was restricted here, the country scored a 
negative rating on the question. 
However, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 (BCEA) does not 
impose any specific limitations on the number of hours that can be worked at 
night, nor does it require the payment of a “specific premium”. It does, however, 
require that some compensation be paid. 
This is a far cry from completely banning night work; yet South Africa receives 
the same rating as a country that prohibits all work at night, or work by women 
at night, or in which legislation imposes a mandatory pay premium for night 
work in all sectors of the economy. 
  4.3 The “Difficulty of Firing” Index
Here the focus is exclusively on the costs of redundancy, which would 
affect foreign investors more. But evidence suggests that, for South African 
employers, the costs associated with terminating employment are determined 
to a greater extent by cases of misconduct rather than redundancy. 
On the issue of whether the employer needs to notify a third party (such as a 
government agency) to terminate one redundant worker South Africa scores a 
negative rating. This rating is incorrect. 
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It is true that, in South Africa, consultation is required with a trade union or 
workplace forum. But this is not the same as a government agency. The DB 
survey assumes equivalence between the need to consult a trade union with 
the need to consult a government department. 
In practice in South Africa, there is no need to consult the union if the employee 
to be made redundant is not a trade union member. A possible explanation for 
the rating South Africa got is that respondents did not take into account the fact 
that the employee concerned was a non-union member. This again illustrates 
the extent to which the particular assumptions affect the rating one way or the 
other. 
The same arguments hold on the question whether an employer needs to 
notify a third party to terminate a group of more than 20 redundant workers. 
On the issue of whether the law requires the employer to consider reassignment 
or retraining options before redundancy termination, South Africa scores a 
negative rating. But the question is whether this is an actual “rigidity” as the 
onus on the employer is merely to consider. 
On the issue of whether priority rules apply for redundancies, South Africa 
receives a negative rating, but this was changed to positive in 2007. The DB 
gives no indication of what is regarded as a “priority rule”. In South Africa, 
legislation requires that employees are retrenched in a way which is fair and 
objective. The Code of Good Practice: Dismissal sets out criteria which are 
generally accepted to be fair, which include the principle of seniority articulated 
through the “last-in first-out” principle. However, the Code is permissive, and 
emphasises that each case is unique.
The conclusion that South Africa has priority rules appears to be based on the 
case law interpreting the legislation, which is not permissible in terms of the 
DB methodology. 




A large section of the paper deals with developing indicators for 
South African labour market regulation, including aspects such as the 
casualisation of the labour force and the fact that many employees are 
not covered by legislation; the number of days allowed to work; unfair 
dismissal and the role of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration and collective bargaining. In this policy brief, the emphasis 
has fallen on the World Bank’s Doing Business Survey, which purports 
to be an objective measurement of the costs of labour market regulation 
in countries, including South Africa. The paper finds that the DB survey 
has many methodological shortcomings, and has made some mistakes 
in its assessment of South Africa. 
